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Abstract
This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall’s theory of firm
pricing behavior under competitive conditions. It considers to what ex-
tent average cost and marginal cost pricing rules characterize Marshall’s
competitive partial equilibrium, and it shows that the two rules differ
for origins and can be reconciled only with great difficulty in a general
equilibrium framework.
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‘Only through the principle of competition has political economy
any pretension to the character of science’ (Mill, 1848, II: 239)
1 Introduction
Partial long-run competitive equilibrium requires the equality of price, marginal
and average cost of production. This condition assures the equilibrium both of
the individual firm and of the industry. The former is maximizing its profit by
producing a quantity where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, and, at the
same time, there are no incentives to enter or exit the latter as it yields the nor-
mal rate of profit. In what follows I argue that average cost and marginal cost
pricing theories have very distinct origins as they are rooted, respectively, in the
classical and marginalistic theory of competition. I will analyze to what extent
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and under which circumstances they joined in the work of Alfred Marshall and
his followers and I will argue they are incompatible in a general equilibrium
framework unless constant returns to scale are assumed. The analysis of Mar-
shall’s work and its relation to the classical school on one side and to Cournot
on the other, shows that only partial evidence can be found to support the
adoption of the notion of marginal cost pricing by Marshall. However, it will be
argued, he developed some concepts, such as the distinction between short and
long periods and the notion of quasi-rents, which turned out to be fundamental
for the joint acceptance of marginal cost and average cost pricing principles by
the Marshallian school.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main
features of classical and perfect competition through the work of Adam Smith
and Cournot; Section 3 describes the relationship between Marshall and the
classical tradition; Section 4 is dedicated to Cournot’s influence on Marshall;
Section 5 analyzes Marshall’s theory of competition and supply; Section 6 links
Marshall’s work and the recent debate on value theory and Section 7 concludes
with some remarks.
2 Classical and marginalistic competition
The discontinuity between the classical notion of competition and the neoclas-
sical perfect competition has been widely emphasized in economic literature; it
has been stressed by Hayek (1948) and later endorsed and further elaborated
by others (see for example Stigler, 1957; McNulty, 1967, 1968, 1987; Harris,
1988, Backhouse, 1990; Blaug, 1997). The basic idea is that in classical political
economy competition keeps its everyday-life meaning. It is the process,1 the
race by which producers and buyers compete either for market shares or the
availability of goods; the outcome of this process is the tendency of prices and
rate of rewards of productive resources to their natural levels. The neoclassi-
cal notion (whose first analytical formulation is due to Cournot, 1838), on the
contrary, would describe the final state of the economy, where the competitive
process comes to rest. It is a market condition defined in terms of number of
agents and their capability of affecting prices; such capacity is null under perfect
competition. Hence the paradox that perfect competition rules out any actual
competitive activities:
‘. . . the modern theory of competitive equilibrium assumes the situation to
exist which a true explanation ought to account for as the effect of competitive
process...’ (Hayek, 1948, 94)
‘Competition came to mean, with the mathematical economists, a hypothet-
ically realized situation in which business rivalry, or competition in the Smithian
sense, was ruled out by definition.’ (McNulty, 1967, 398)
1 See for example Blaug (1997, 67): ‘for Smith competition is not a state or a situation but
a behavioural activity..’ and Harris (1988, 140): ‘The classical conception of competition is
that it is a process, not a state.’
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‘. . . perfect competition deals with a situation where competition, as the term
is commonly understood, is absent.’ (Backhouse, 1990, 58)
According to McNulty, this absence of actual competitive behavior under
perfect competition would render the two notions of competition not only differ-
ent but also incompatible: ‘For Smith, then, competition was a process through
which a predict result, the equation of price and cost, was achieved. With
Cournot it became the realized result itself. The two concepts are not only differ-
ent; they are fundamentally incompatible.’ (McNulty, ibid.) The last statement
is not uncontroversial; we aim at analyzing to what extent the two concepts
of competition merged in the Marshallian theory of the firm, and what is the
historical process that led to such coexistence.
2.1 Smith’s gravitation
As we said, competition in classical political economy enforces the tendency
of prices towards their costs of production. We can illustrate this mechanism
by referring to Smith’s description of the gravitation process (Smith, 1776, I,
vii). Smith introduces the concept of effectual demand as the quantity of goods,
which the market would absorb at its cost of production (or natural price). If the
quantity brought to market is lower than effectual demand, then competition
between buyers brings the market price of the commodity above its normal
price. As this causes the rate of profit to rise above the normal level there will
be an incentive for new capital to enter that trade, production will increase,
market prices will be forced down and normal profitability will be restored.
A symmetric mechanism assures the tendency of market prices to their natural
values if the quantity brought to market is initially higher than effectual demand.
The outcome of this process is therefore that ‘natural price is, as it were, the
central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating’
(ibid., 75). Free mobility of resources among different productions is required
to make this process operate effectively.
2.2 Cournot and perfect competition
Cournot (1838, Ch. IV) adopted a downward sloping demand curve to describe
the market of a commodity. Without any kind of microfounded rationale, he
stated the existence of a continuous (and differentiable) function, which, for any
given price, indicates the amount of the good the market would absorb.2 In the
analysis of monopoly (Ch. V), he introduced the profit maximizing behavior
of the firm and he derived the optimality condition as the point where the
marginal revenue of an additional unit of output equals its marginal cost of
production. Competition is introduced by adding producers in the market. The
way they interact in the market has become so famous to be named after the
French mathematician: firms adopt a Cournot-competition behavior if they take
total supply as given and they maximize their revenue on the residual portion
2 Dupuit (1844) was the first economist to establish explicitly the connection between de-
mand and marginal utility.
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of the demand function. Cournot proved the existence of a stable equilibrium
where all firms (if they share the same technology) produce the same amount
of good; equilibrium price is a monotonic decreasing function of the number
of participants in the market. In the limit, when the number of firm tends to
infinity and the quantity produced by each of them becomes inappreciable, price
equals marginal cost.
He saw clearly that this equality allowed him to express the production of
any firm as a mere function of price and, in turn, to derive the supply function
of the market as the horizontal sum of individual supplies. More, he stressed
that marginal cost functions must be increasing ‘otherwise the gross value of
the product [..] would be less than the costs of production..’ (ibid., VIII, 91); in
case marginal costs are decreasing it means ‘that the effect of monopoly is not
wholly extinct, or that the variation of the amount produced by each individual
producer affects the total production of the article, and its price, to a perceptible
extent’ (ibid., 91-92): competition and increasing returns are incompatible.
Cournot carefully ruled out the possibility of competitive firms producing
with decreasing costs, as the marginal cost pricing would let them have losses.
On the other hand he was not troubled by the possibility that the equilibrium
may occur at a point where, although ‘the effects of competition have reached
their limit’, firms are earning profits, which is the case with increasing mar-
ginal costs. Contrary to the classical tradition where competition erases profits,
perfect competition, at its very birth, did not require the absence of profits.
Cournot’s analysis lacks a temporal dimension: elaborating the distinction be-
tween short and long period will be a fundamental step in reconciling marginal
cost pricing with the zero-profit equilibrium condition.3
3 Continuity and discontinuity betweenMarshall
and the classical tradition
The most eminent biographers and editors of Marshall’s work (see for exam-
ple Groenewegen 1995, Guillebaud 1960 in Marshall 1920, Keynes 1924, and
Whitaker in Marshall 1975) have emphasized the influence of the classical tra-
dition on Marshall’s economic apprenticeship. Marshall himself stressed the con-
tinuity between his work and the classical political economy.4 He approached
political economy in 1866-67 by reading Mill’s (1848) Principles of Political
3 As early as in 1844 Dupuit formulated the distinction between short and long term equilib-
rium. He anticipated Marshall’s analysis on so many fundamental points that the suggestion
to talk of ‘Dupuit-Marshall theory of competitive equilibrium’ by Ekelund and Hèbert (1999)
should be welcome. In our reconstruction, we do not analyze Dupuit’s contribution in detail,
as Marshall did not have direct knowledge of his work until he had fully developed his own
analysis. (‘..it seems quite likely that Dupuit’s work was completely unknown in England
until Jevons came upon it in the later 1870s.’, Whitaker in Marshall, 1975, II: 281’)
4 Marshall’s claims of continuity with the classical tradition should be warily considered as
‘he had a pronounced tendency so to phrase his own doctrines as to minimize the change from
the classical tradition.’ (Stigler, 1941, 63)
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Economy, which he considered as the basis for his ‘translation’ into mathemat-
ics of Ricardo’s theory:
‘While still giving private lessons in mathematics, he translated as many as
possible of Ricardo’s reasonings into mathematics; and he endeavoured to make
them more general’ (Marshall, Autobiography, in Keynes, 1924, 328)
‘. . . my main position as to the theory of value and distribution was practi-
cally completed in the year 1867-70, when I translated Mill’s version of Ricardo’s
or Smith’s doctrines into mathematics’ (Marshall, letter to Clark, 24/iii/1908,
in Pigou 1925, 416).
As we discussed above, the value of a good in Smith’s analysis is deter-
mined by its cost of production; the relation between demand and supply of
a good does not enter the determination of the natural price but only market
prices’ deviations from it. Obviously, Smith and the classical economists clearly
acknowledged the role of patterns of demand in determining the composition
and the scale of output; accordingly, they understood that, under non-constant
returns to scale, demand affects normal prices. However, as the idea of the
simultaneous determination of prices and quantities was extraneous to the clas-
sical economists they could focus on technology and distribution when studying
the determinants of value.5
Mill (1848) began to introduce changes in this notion of value. He suggested
that goods could be divided into three categories according to the laws that
regulate their value. Goods available in given amount constitute the first class.
In this case, the equality between demand and supply regulate their value:
supply is given and equality is achieved by changes in demand. The point to be
stressed is that demand is characterized as a function of price and Mill is aware
of the important break with respect to the classical tradition he is introducing:
‘. . . it is usually supposed (. . . ) that the value depends upon the ratio between
effectual demand, as thus defined [Mill is here referring to Smith], and the
supply’. (Mill, 1848, III, ii, §3, 465) On the contrary, the value of a good is
not the outcome of a ratio between two given quantities, demand changes as a
function of price, which settles at the level where demand equals supply: ‘. . . the
quantity demanded is not a fixed quantity, even at the same time and place; it
varies according to the value (. . . ) The idea of a ratio as between demand and
supply is out of place (. . . ) the proper mathematical analogy is of an equation’
(ibid., 465-7)
Goods indefinitely reproducible belong to the second class. For this class
the law of the cost of production as the sum of normal wages and profit holds
5 From a neoclassical point of view, neglecting demand in the theory of value can be un-
derstood only by assuming constant returns. This is exactly Marshall’s interpretation of the
classics. According to him, Ricardo, although aware of the laws of decreasing and increasing
returns, decided to assume constant returns when deriving his theory of value. In turn, he
prevented demand to play any role in the determination of normal value. (see Marshall, 1920,
I: 814) Early Sraffa arrived to analogous conclusions: ‘In normal cases the cost of production
of commodities produced competitively -. . . - must be regarded as constant in respect of small
variations in the quantity produced’ (Sraffa, 1926, 540-1). Only later Sraffa (1960) suggested
separating the analysis of prices and quantities so that the issue of returns to scale is irrelevant
to determine the influence of demand on prices (Sraffa, 1960, Preface).
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without substantial changes with respect to the classical tradition. In this cat-
egory, demand and supply maintain a role in determining the market values if
different from the natural ones: ‘The real law of demand and supply, the equa-
tion between them, still holds good: if a value different from the natural value
be necessary to make the demand equal to supply, the market value will deviate
from the natural value.’ (ibid., 475)
The third class finally, encompasses goods whose reproduction may be in-
definite but implies increasing costs: ‘commodities which can be multiplied to
an indefinite extent by labour and expenditure, but not by a fixed amount of
labour and expenditure..’. (ibid., 464)
To sum up: ‘. . . demand and supply govern the value of all things which
cannot be indefinitely increased (. . . ). But in all things which admit of indefinite
multiplication, demand and supply only determine the perturbations of value,
(. . . ). While still ruling the oscillations of value, they themself obey a superior
force, which makes value gravitate towards Cost of Production (. . . ) demand
and supply always rush to an equilibrium, but the condition of stable equilibrium
is when things exchange for each other according to their cost of production, or,
in the expression we have used, when things are at their Natural Value.’ (ibid.,
476) Cost of production and demand and supply coexist as complementary
explanations of value for different classes of goods. However, the occurrence of a
change with respect to the classical theory of value is apparent. Dardi (1984, 54)
underlines the identification of the ‘stable equilibrium’ and the classical ‘Natural
Value’. It would seem that natural price became the equilibrium price in the
constant returns to scale case, thus assuming just a particular and subordinate
role in determining the value of a good with respect to the action of demand and
supply. Marshall would take the next step: by claiming the generality of the
non-constant returns to scale production he will be able to guarantee demand
a central role in value theory.
Before moving to Marshall however, it is worth commenting briefly on a
controversy between Mill and Thornton, which contributed to move value theory
further in the direction of the supply and demand approach. In On Labour
Thornton (1869) tries to show the non-existence of the theory of value in general:
‘. . . inasmuch as the sole function of scientific law is to predict the invariable
recurrence of the same effects from the same causes, (. . . ) price cannot possibly
be subjected to law’, (Thornton, 1869, II, i, 82) and, in particular of the supply
and demand approach: ‘The question we are discussing is wheter it be true that
price is determined by supply and demand; (. . . ) [and] that the prices at which
sales take place are those at which supply and demand are equalised’ (ibid., 54).
According to Thornton, since prices are the outcome of the bargaining
process between buyers and sellers they lie within buyers’ and sellers’ reser-
vation prices. Sellers, who will try to obtain the highest possible price at which
they can sell their whole stock of goods, usually set prices. In their search of
the highest price, they will moderate their demands for the fear of other sellers’
competition: such competition determines prices. Unfortunately, since compe-
tition does not follow any rule, the same has to be said for price determination:
‘. . . there [is] no law of competition. Neither (. . . ) if competition be (. . . ) the
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determining cause of price, can there be any law of price.’ (ibid., 80-1)
In order to prove wrong the demand and supply approach Thornton provides
a series of practical examples where prices at which transactions occur do not
equate demand and supply. In his reply, Mill concedes the possibility of such
cases, which however have to be seen as anomalies not invalidating the general
law of value:
‘Instead of conflicting with the law, this is the extreme case which proves the
law. The law is that the price will be that which equalises the demand with the
supply; and the example proves that this only fails to be the case when there
is no price that would fulfil the condition, and even then, the same causes, still
operating, keep the price at the point which will mostly nearly fulfil it.’ (Mill,
1869, 638)
‘The doctrine he controverts, though true, is not the whole truth. (. . . )
there are cases which it does not reach’ (ibid., 641).
Moreover, Mill accounts for these anomalies by hypothesizing particular
shapes of the curves of demand and supply that could make them arise:6 the
abandonment of the classical theory of value is complete.
In ‘Mr Mill’s Theory of Value’, Marshall provides his interpretation of Mill’s
theory. His emphasis is on the demand side while the cost of production has
a subordinate role: ‘Some persons fail to see that (..) [Mill’s] “Law of Cost of
Production” is regarded by him as operative only as a result of, or a corollary
from, the law according to which the action of the producers of a commodity is
governed by their calculations of the circumstances of the future supply and de-
mand in the market.’ (Marshall, 1876, 127) He rejects the identification between
Mill’s theory and the law of the cost of production: ‘I propose, then, to speak
of the form of exposition of Mill’s central doctrine, (. . . ), as “ The Law of Free
Production and Average Demand” (. . . ); and to speak of Mill’s Laws of Cost
of Production (. . . ) as corollaries from it’. (ibid., 128) The equality between
supply and demand has to be considered the general law of value: ‘. . . we are
to regard the average exchange value as under normal circumstances equating
supply and demand.’ (ibid., 129)
Right before stating the law, Marshall reminds us that Mill had conceived
demand as a function of price, but instead of confining this law to the case of
non-reproducible goods, he says: ‘Although Mill puts this statement in the most
prominent place possible, and repeats it, some of his critics have not seen its full
force.’ (ibid., 129) Marshall captured the force and the importance of demand
as a function of price. In the Principles he generalized its application to all the
possible market situations, which are not distinguished by the kind of good but
by the time allowed for the equalization between demand and supply.
We saw that in classical political economy supply conditions regulated nor-
mal value. With Marshall, the demand side obtains an equal and symmetric
role as supply in determining the value of a good. Clearly, in order for this to be
6 Most of the examples proposed by Thornton can be understood as cases where supply and
demand functions are discontinuous. Indeed Mill notices: ‘either the demand or the supply
advanc[e] or reced[e] by such violent skips, that there is no halting point at which it just equals
the other element’. (Mill, 1869, 641)
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possible in a framework of simultaneous determination of prices and quantities,
a non-constant relation between cost and amount produced is required. De-
mand would otherwise merely determine the quantity produced with no effect
on value.
If, as Shove speculated: ‘. . . Marshall began with the objective demand and
supply schedules, the phenomena of the market place, and worked back from
them to their psychological basis, not (. . . ) the other way about’ (Shove, 1942,
307), it is worth analyzing how Marshall, after building the industry supply
curve, tried to substantiate it with the analysis of supply at the individual
producer level.
4 Marshall and Cournot7
In analyzing Marshall’s economic formation and apprenticeship the role of Cournot
and von Thünen stand right after the classical tradition; at least, they are the
economists Marshall is most willing to acknowledge his intellectual debt to. In
particular, they are fundamental in the development of the notion of equilib-
rium as balance at the margin between benefits and costs. In the Preface to
the first edition of the Principles (1890) Marshall writes: ‘Under the guidance
of Cournot, and in a less degree of von Thünen, I was led to attach great im-
portance to the fact that our observations of nature, ..., relate not so much to
aggregate quantities, as to the increment of quantities, and that in particular
the demand for a thing is a continuous function, of which the “marginal” incre-
ment is, in stable equilibrium, balanced against the corresponding increment of
its cost of production’. (I: x)
In his own reconstruction, Marshall estimates he ‘read Cournot in 1868’
(Pigou, 1925, 413).8 As we saw, Cournot had a neat formulation of perfectly
competitive equilibrium based on the equality between price and marginal cost,
where the industrial marginal cost is obtained as the horizontal sum of the
individual ones. We aim at investigating two strongly intertwined issues. First,
to what extent Marshall shared this notion of competitive equilibrium and,
second, why he avoided the analysis of individual producer until the first edition
of the Principles even though he had known Cournot for so long.
Accepting Cournot’s competitive analysis was problematic for at least three
reasons: the existence of a surplus of revenues over costs in equilibrium, the
independence of the cost structure from aggregate production (i.e. external
(dis)economies), the conclusion that competition and increasing returns were
incompatible.
7 From now on, unless otherwise stated, all references to Marshall are taken from ‘Marshall,
A. (1920) Principles of Economics, ninth (variorum) edition, Guillebaud ed., 2 vols. London:
Macmillan, 1960’.
8 A pre-1870 dating for Marshall’s knowledge of Cournot is confirmed both by Groenewegen
(1995, 150) and by Whitaker (in Marshall, 1975, II: 240).
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An annotation of Marshall’s copy of Cournot reads: ‘..he points out the
terrible result wh . would arise if the total demand price fell short of the total
supply price. But he seems to see no objection to its falling short. Yet from
the point of view of normal theory one plan is as bad as the other.’(Marshall,
1975, II: 305). The same concern is voiced a few years later in a fragment
whose more plausible attribution is 1874: ‘[Cournot] however says that φ′′(xk)
must be positive; because if it were not xf(x) would be less than
∑∫
φ′(xk)dxk
[i.e.
∑
φ(xk)]. That it to say the trade would be carried on at a loss. He does not
see that there is an equal objection to its being greater’ (ibid., II: 305) (with φ()
and f() being respectively total cost and demand price as a function of output).
Years later, in a letter of 1888 to J.N. Keynes he refers to the same fragment
by noticing that he had ‘gone at some length into the question whether the
marginal expenses of production is to be regarded as φ(x)∆x or as ∆(xφ(x))
where y = φ(x) is the equation to supply curve, y being the price & x amount
of commodity’ (ibid., II: 302). The question Marshall had been asking was
whether the marginal expenses of production are given by the average cost at
the margin or by the increment in total cost.9 In a related manuscript fragment,
probably later than 1874, he had clearly implied that it is average cost which
has to be considered as equaling the marginal expenses of production: ‘..in the
economic supply curve ... xy (y being the expenses of production on the margin)
is the only definition available of aggregate expenses of production.’ (ibid., 302
n.) From this account, it emerges that Marshall, much in the classical spirit,
demands the absence of profits from a position of equilibrium; and that he saw
clearly that increasing costs are problematic from this point of view. Cournot’s
equilibrium analysis lacks a time dimension, and such absence is responsible
for the existence of equilibrium profit: marginal cost pricing was not a feasible
option until the distinction between short and long term, and the related notion
of quasi rents as temporary excess of revenues over costs would be elaborated.10
It is worth noting that a constant returns technology, the obvious candidate
to reconcile marginal and average costs, could not be considered by Marshall
as it was in clear conflict with his attempt to establish a role for demand in
determining normal value.
In the 1874 fragment we referred to, Marshall seems to attribute the whole
difference between marginal and average cost to the existence of external dis-
economies. In fact, he rejects marginal cost pricing not only because it would
lead to excess profits, but also because it would imply that the producer would
have to ‘take into calculation the indirect results of his action on the expenses
of producing the whole supply’ (ibid., 303). Marshall fails to note that with in-
dividual increasing cost, which is Cournot’s assumption, marginal cost exceeds
average cost for any level of production even without externalities. However,
the point sheds light on Marshall’s dissatisfaction for making costs dependent
9 Notice the change in notation: in the first quotation φ(x) represents total cost of producing
x, in the second it is the supply price.
10 Given this account, Marshall’s claim of having developed the doctrine of quasi-rents seems
unlikely: ‘I may say that my doctrine of quasi-rents, ... , took substance in 1868’. (Marshall,
1925, 412)
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merely on individual output: ‘[Cournot] has supposed that each ones produc-
tion is independent of each other person;...But then φ′(xk) depends entirely on
the accidents of individual k, with wh. economics has nothing to do’ (from
Marshall’s copy of Cournot, ibid. 305).
Finally, Cournot had adopted the assumption of increasing costs to avoid
that his analysis would lead to the extinction of competition in favor of monopoly.
His solution looked particularly unsatisfactory to Marshall who was strongly
aware of the relevance of the increasing returns in the manufacturing indus-
try: ‘My confidence in Cournot as an economist was shaken when I found that
his mathematics re I.R. (increasing return) led inevitably to things which do
not exist and have no near relation to reality.’ (letter to Flux 7/iii/1898, in
Pigou, A.C. ), (1925), 406-7) Such dissatisfaction spurred Marshall’s search for
economic reality (’my Wanderjahre among factories...to discover how Cournot’s
premises were wrong’) which produced what he deems his solution to the prob-
lem of increasing returns: ‘The chief outcome of my work in this direction, which
occupied me a good deal between 1870 and 1890, is in the Representative firm
theory, the supplementary cost analysis, as well as the parts that directly relate
to supply price for I.R’. (ibid. p.407) It seems plausible that Marshall waited
until he found what considered satisfactory solutions to Cournot’s shortcomings
before developing the equilibrium analysis as balance at the margin between
benefits and costs: ‘his failure contributed to make me hold back most of my
diagrams as to value from formal publication for twenty years’ (II: 69). In the
next section, we investigate the evolution of Marshall’s treatment of supply and
competition.
5 Marshall on competition and supply
5.1 Competition
The first printed exposition of Marshall’s theory of value can be found in The
Pure Theory of Domestic Value (1879a). Around 1873 or 1874 Marshall began to
work on the composition of a volume on international trade; the work was later
abandoned due to Marshall’s illness but Henry Sidgwick obtained permission
to print some chapters of it for private circulation in Cambridge: chapters V
and VI constituted The Pure Theory of Domestic Value.11 The object of the
book is to ‘determine the relative values of commodities produced in the same
country under the action of free competition.’ (Marshall, 1879a, 1) The analysis
is carried out in the partial equilibrium approach by means of diagrams. The
11 These chapters were widely known in Cambridge as a manuscript at least since 1875.
According to Keynes: ‘These must have been substantially complete about 1873 and were
communicated to his pupils (. . . ) about that date’ (Keynes, 1924, 332); Whitaker instead
notes: ‘..the Pure Theory of Domestic Value, probably written around 1875’ (Marshall, 1975,
I: 49). Moreover, The Pure Theory heavily relies on the unpublished ‘Essay on Value’, which
was probably completed in 1870 or 1871 (Whitaker: ‘..the Essay should have been composed
in 1870, or perhaps 1871’ (Marshall, 1975, I: 120).
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normal value is determined as the intersection between demand and supply
functions.12 Free competition has a central role as it is responsible for the
enforcement of the tendency of demand price and supply price to a common
value (‘the great central law of economics’ (ibid., 3)). It is described along
classical lines: if demand price exceeds supply price, producers will earn more
than the normal rate of profit, new capital will enter that trade to re-establish
normal profitability. While the value theory is changing towards demand and
supply approach, the notion of competition is unaffected.
In The Economics of Industry (1879b), Marshall and Paley Marshall adopt
a similar notion of competition. In the preface to the second edition of his book
(1881), they provide us with a definition:
‘A man competes freely when he is pursuing a course which without en-
tering into any combinations with others, he has deliberately selected as that
which is likely to be the greatest material advantage to himself and his family
(. . . ). Normal results in Economics are therefore those which would be brought
about in the long run by this active principle, if it had time to overcome -
(. . . ) - custom, inertness, ignorance, and all the other passive elements which
make up economic friction.’ (Marshall and Paley Marshall, 1879b, vi) The co-
incidence between competition and normality must be emphasized as it will be
later rejected. However, at this stage of his intellectual development, economic
analysis, for Marshall, should be concerned with results emerging when the ac-
tion of competition is free to operate. When the access to production is ‘free
for everybody’, the principle of competition is effective and the normal value of
a good can emerge.
The Principles retain this conception but with one fundamental change.
In the introduction (I, i, 4) Marshall defines competition as ‘the racing of one
person against another, with special reference to bidding for the sale or purchase
of anything.’ (I: 4). This implies that when analyzing the normal value of a
good under competitive conditions, (V, iii), he assumes that ‘there is no close
combination among dealers on either side, but each acts for himself, and there is
much free competition; buyers generally compete freely with buyers, and sellers
compete freely with sellers’ (I: 284). Competition then demands the pursuit of
self-interest and it is the ‘active force’ (I: 287) which guarantees the amount
produced to be the one which brings about the equilibrium between normal
demand and normal supply. However, the position held in (V, iii) has to be
considered only as a provisional assumption, and it is in fact rejected in the
rest of the Principles. An annotation on an 1886 Marshall copy of Economics
of Industry is instructive of such change; it reads: ‘Be careful to strike out
everything wh. implies that normal value=competitive value’ (Marshall, 1975,
I: 73 n.). Such warning has been seconded in several instances in the Principles:
12 In developing his geometrical illustration of supply and demand Marshall was influenced
by German 19th century economic school, Rau and Mangoldt in particular. (see Groenewegen,
1995, 153-4) On the contrary, Marshall always denied any influence of Jenkin (‘..evidence on
dating is insufficient to justify Marshall’s claim that he anticipated Jenkin, but there is nothing
in the annotations making such a claim inherently implausible’, Whitaker in Marshall, 1975,
II: 241)
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‘Of course Normal does not mean Competitive. Market prices and Normal
prices are alike brought about by a multitude of influences...of which some are
competitive and some are not’ (I: 347, appeared in 1907, 5th edition). Marshall
himself recognized such a change in a letter to J.B. Clark, written in 1902:
‘I then believed it was possible to have a coherent though abstract doctrine of
economics in which competition was the only dominant force; and I then defined
‘normal’ as that which the undisturbed play of competition would bring about:
and now I regard that position as untenable’ (quoted in Guillebaud, 1952, 122).
A possible guess which may be ventured to rationalize the coexistence of the
two conflicting claims is that Marshall proposes two distinct analyses of mar-
kets equilibrium: a formal one which can be represented in mathematical terms,
assumes ‘much free competition’ and applies only under certain conditions (‘ne-
glecting those features which are special to particular parts of economic science’,
I: 341); and a general one, more ‘in accordance with the actual facts of life’ (I:
341), which captures all the elements determining the true normal value of a
commodity. In Section 5.3 we will analyze both in some detail.
5.2 Supply in the Early Writings
We have emphasized that Marshall, in his interpretation of the Classics, estab-
lished a symmetric role of demand and supply as determinants of value. In a
famous analogy, demand and supply are compared to two ‘blades of a pair of
scissors’ of which it cannot be said which is the cutting one. A non-constant
supply curve is a necessary condition for such symmetry to be possible; indeed,
according to Marshall, Ricardo’s mistake consisted of assuming constant costs
even though he was aware of the laws of decreasing and increasing returns.
Since the early writings, Marshall analyzed the forces underlying the non-
constant behavior of the supply curve. In The Pure Theory supply is charac-
terized as the set of unit prices that cover the expenses of production, i.e. an
average cost curve. It is governed by the law of variable returns. Typically,
raw materials are subject to decreasing returns as nature offers limited endow-
ments of resources; manufactures, where most economies of production are to
be found, are mostly subject to the law of increasing returns. The expansion of
the whole market, i.e. the industry, is a necessary condition for the availabil-
ity of economies of scale. The increase in industry’s output necessary to bring
about these economies can be satisfied both by increasing the scale of the single
firm and by the aggregation into one district of a large number of small firms:
‘..the advantages which are generally classed under the heads of the division of
labour and production on a large scale can be attained almost as fully by the
aggregation into one district of many establishments of a moderate size as by
the erection of a few huge factories’ (Marshall, 1879a, 8).
The treatment of division of labor in The Economics of Industry, (I, viii),
develops along similar lines. The extent of the market is the necessary condi-
tion for economies of scale to arise. The question to address is whether these
advantages depend on the scale of the firm; many of these economies are not
12
specific to large firms but can be also obtained by small factories. This can
occur ‘provided that there are a very great number of them in the trade’ (I, viii,
§4, 52). When demand is high, the process of production can often be divided
into several stages of production, some of which can be performed by Subsidiary
Industries, with small-scale factories. However, ‘small factories, whatever their
numbers, will be at a great disadvantage relatively to large unless many of them
are collected together in the same district‘ as they can exploit ‘the advantage of
the Localization of Industry’ (ibid., 53). Marshall relies on external economies
to face the problem of increasing returns.13
5.3 The Principles and the individual producer
IN the ‘Principles’ Marshall introduced the key elements of his theory of the
individual firm: the principle of substitution, the distinction between short and
long run, the prime and supplementary cost concepts, and the representative
firm. I will try to show in what follows the complexity of Marshall’s analysis
and how a particular interpretation of his work led to the notion of long run
partial equilibrium we are now familiar with.
5.3.1 The formal analysis
Marshall’s analysis of the individual producer is based on the principle of sub-
stitution among methods of production. Marshall claimed he had derived this
principle by the beginning of the 1870s when his theory of distribution was al-
most fully developed.14 However, it is only with the Principles that we find its
application to the theory of the firm.
The principle of substitution contends that firms will adopt the method
capable of producing a given amount of good at the lowest cost:
‘. . . [producers] in each case choose those factors of production which are best
for their purpose; the sum of the supply prices of those factors which are used is,
13 Marshall’s external economies seem to pertain more to the whole economy rather than to
a single industry. Stigler notices: ‘Marshall’s external economies form an essentially historical
category. The development of knowledge and invention, cross-fertilization, the emergence of
subsidiary firms to exploit by-products and to supply equipment, the accumulation of skilled
labour, all are characterized by growth.’ (Stigler, 1941, 71)
14 ‘Before 1871 (. . . ) I had worked out the whole skeleton of my present system in math-
ematics though not in English. (. . . ) Notes XIV-XX were evolved in substance about same
time. These contained the substance of my doctrine of Substitution; though I did not make
use of that term till long after. (..) the one book which really guided me was written by (..)
von Thünen’ (Marshall, 1975, 38). Thünen seems the only economist Marshall is willing to
acknowledge in his development of the marginal theory of distribution; Walker’s influence was
strongly denied (see Marshall, 1925, 416). See Groenewegen (1995, 151) on how such emphasis
on Thünen’s relevance relates to Marshall’s claims to independent development of marginal-
ism. Whitaker doubts that Marshall had worked out already in 1869 a theory of distribution
based on the marginal productivity. After exposing large evidence for supporting his point
(see Whitaker, ‘The Formation of Marshall’s Economic Doctrines, 1867-73’ in Marshall, 1975,
37-52) he concludes : ‘the theory of distribution remained imperfectly settled in Marshall’s
mind even after 1876, so that he had remained reluctant to write about it in the Economics of
Industry, “because I did not then see my way clearly as to some parts of it” (with I referring
to Marshall) ’ (51-2) .
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as a rule, less than the sum of the supply prices of any other set of factors which
could be substituted for them; and whenever it appears to the producers that
this is not the case, they will as a rule, set to work to substitute the less expensive
method. (. . . ) We may call this (. . . ) The principle of substitution’ (I: 284). As
of how much to produce the entrepreneur ‘pushes the investment of capital in
its business in each several direction until what appears in his judgment to be
the outer limit, or margin, of profitableness is reached; that is, until there seems
to him no good reason for thinking that the gains resulting from any further
investment in that particular direction would compensate him for his outlay’
(I: 356, 359). Indeed, the choice of the cheapest method of production and of
the limit of production are not independent as the principle of substitution is
connected to the tendency to diminishing returns: ‘This principle of substitution
is closely connected with, and is indeed partly based on, that tendency to a
diminishing rate of return from any excessive application of resources or of
energies in any given direction’ (I: 356). At this stage (V, iv) Marshall is carrying
on his analysis under the provisional assumption of ‘much free competition’,
which, as we noted above (cfr. supra § 5.1), he described along classical lines and
identified with freedom of entry. At the same time, in discussing the problems
related to the investment and distribution of resources he suggested (I: 357 n.)
to read the text in connection with Note XIV of the Mathematical Appendix.
In the note, which appeared in the third edition (1895), Marshall adopts the
language of differential calculus to state that profit maximization will imply
the equality between marginal outlay (V ) and marginal receipts (H) for any
agent of production ( dV
dxi
= dH
dβj
dβj
dxi
, where x is an agent of production and β is
the particular use in which the agent is employed). Here Marshall is explicitly
adopting Cournot’s principle of equality between marginal revenue and marginal
cost. Even more, he clearly states the equality between marginal revenue and
demand price: ‘If ... an individual undertaker produced Q′, a thousand[th] part
of Q then the increased receipt from putting on an additional man is p∆Q′ ,....;
and the deduction to be made from it is only Q′∆p, which is a thousand part of
Q∆p and may be neglected. For the purpose therefor[e] of illustrating a part of
the general action of the law of distribution we are justified in speaking of the
value of the net product taken at the normal selling value of the product, that is,
as p∆Q’ (I: 850). At least beginning with 1895 he provides an explicit example of
perfect competition and marginal cost pricing.15 By suggesting reading jointly
(V, iv) and note XIV, Marshall established a connection between free and perfect
15 In light of the last quote, claims that Marshall never adopted perfect competition are sur-
prising: ‘But Marshall nowhere assumes a horizontal demand curve’ (Maxwell, 1958, 694); ‘It
is true,.., that Marshall has nowhere committed himself in words to the completely horizontal
[demand curve] of a perfect market..’ (Robertson, 1956, 18-9). See also Wolfe (1954, 341).
Questioning the relevance of perfect competition for the Marshallian industrial analysis seems
a more tenable option: ‘Beginning with the third (1895) edition, (..) [Marshall] explicitly
introduced the horizontal demand curve for individual firm as the normal case and gave it
the same mathematical formulation as did Cournot. But these were patchwork revisions, and
they were not carried over into the many passages where looser concepts of competition had
been employed.’ (Stigler, 1957, 10)
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competition, which, though clearly distinct, coexist in the formal analysis of
investment and distribution.16
Understanding under what circumstances Marshall deems perfect competi-
tion the applicable case is utterly important. This would happen when ‘the
individual [producer] is only one of many who have efficient, if indirect, access
to the market’ (I: 850); on the contrary, he excludes the cases of producers with
‘limited trade connection’ possibly afraid of ‘spoiling their special markets’, the
cases of ‘commercial depression’ and those where ‘expenses of production dimin-
ish rapidly with every increase in the amount produced’ (I: 849). Since these are
the cases that Marshall analyzes in depth when dealing with the manufacturing
sector, the joint reading of chapters iii, iv of book V and note XIV seems to
indicate that perfect competition and marginal cost pricing apply to the agri-
cultural and raw materials sectors where the limited land would guarantee the
presence of decreasing returns.17 Notice that the margin of production depends
on aggregate production: contrary to Cournot, there exist external diseconomies
and, in turn, costs do not depend on individual production only. The existence
of increasing costs does not pose the problem of excess profits characterizing
Cournot’s equilibrium; decreasing returns are due to the existence of a factor
available in fixed quantity and any excess of revenues over outlays would be
absorbed in the form of rent.
The solution to such problem for the case where no scarce resources were
involved in production required the development of the distinction between short
and long run and of the concept of quasi rents.
5.3.2 Short period
The short period is defined as the time during which ‘people take the stock of
appliances of production as practically fixed’ (I: 374). In assessing short-run
production decisions, the distinction between prime and supplementary cost is
relevant. Prime, or special or direct, cost is the share of cost that can be en-
tirely imputed to a certain unit of production: typically, it can be considered
as constituted by the cost of raw materials, labor and wear- and- tear of plants.
Supplementary costs cover the general expenses of the business inclusive of the
interest on fixed investment. Under normal conditions, any producer expects
to charge a price covering both the prime and supplementary costs, but in the
short run, the ‘lowest price at which it will be worth his while to accept an
order’ (I: 360) is regulated by the prime costs. In fact, this would be the case
16 Hart (1996, 360) argues that ’even within the confines of ’free competition’, the market
structure being analysed differs markedly from the large numbers, homogenous product con-
cept’. His case is supported by Marshall insisting that ‘we do not assume that competition is
perfect’ (1920, I: 540). However, as Hart himself notices, Marshall identifies perfect competi-
tion with perfect knowledge; therefore his rejection of perfect competition does not necessarily
rule out the case of negligible size firm. We think the evidence we provided supports the si-
multaneous adoption of classical and perfect competition. We should notice that such result
conflicts with McNulty’s claim of incompatibility between the two notions of competition (cfr.
supra Section 2).
17 ‘The expenses of production of any amount of a raw commodity may be best estimated
with reference to the ‘margin of production’ at which no rent is paid’ (I: 339, n.1).
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only if producers were not afraid of spoiling the markets by accepting too low
prices. Each producer sells both in a particular and in a general market, and
‘[he] fears to spoil his chance of getting a better price later on from his own
costumers; or, if he produces for a large and open market, he is more or less in
fear of incurring the resentment of other producers, should he sell needlessly at
a price that spoils the common market for all’ (I: 374). This is the reason why,
in general, marginal cost pricing does not apply: ‘the true marginal supply price
for short period...is nearly always above, and generally very much above the spe-
cial or prime cost...which is immediately and directly involved by getting a little
further use out of appliances which are not fully employed’ (I: 374-375). The
latest quote gives strong support to those interpreters who, even for the short
period, deny that Marhall adopted marginal cost pricing and who stress, on the
contrary, the non marginalistic elements of his analysis of markets.18 A few lines
before, Marshall describes the relation between price and supply as follows: ‘As
the expectations of price improve, an increased part of the production will yield
a considerable surplus above prime costs, and the margin of production will be
pushed outwards. Every increase in the price expected will, as a rule, induce
some people who would not otherwise have produced anything, to produce a
little; and those who would have produced something for the lower price, will
produce more for the higher price. That part of their production with regard to
which such persons are on the margin of doubt as to whether it is worth while for
them to produce it at the price, is to be included together with that of the per-
sons who are in doubt whether to produce at all; the two together constitute the
marginal production at that price.’(I: 373) A famous interpretation proposed by
Frisch goes in the direction of reconciling Marshall’s description of short period
with Cournot analysis. Individual supply would ‘coincide with the marginal cost
curve’ (Frisch, 1950, 501, italics in the original) and the ‘supply schedule of the
market .. [would be] derived .. by horizontal addition of the individual supply
curves’ (ibid., 504). Only when expected prices are too low firms would adopt
a restrictive strategy by suspending production for fear of spoiling the market.
While it seems plausible that the cost structure is rising, it seems doubtful that
at this point Marshall was trying to derive aggregate supply as the horizontal
sum of individual supplies. As we saw, the identification between marginal cost
and supply curves depends on the adoption of perfect competition so that firms
act as ‘quantity adaptor’ (ibid., 501). Quantity adapting behavior however, is
at odds with Marshall’s preference for referring to the supply price of a certain
quantity rather than to the quantity supplied at a given price (‘the price is that
the expectation of which is sufficient and only just sufficient to make it worth
while for people to set themselves to produce that aggregate amount’, I: 373).
Second, Marshall utilized the fish market as an illustration of the functioning of
18 Robertson (1956) and Andrews (1951) are two of the most eminent scholars sharing this
opinion. According to the former Marshall’s use of the term ‘marginal’ is misleading and it
would not imply the equality of price and the marginal cost of firms (1956, p.14). For Andrews
(1951, p. 148) Marshall did not identify cost and supply curves. See also Williams (1978,
88-90, 106), O’Brien (1990, 69, 78), and Hart (1996, 354).
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short period supply (I: 370). He clearly showed that at least part of the increas-
ing costs is due to external effects: higher wages for sailors and the use of less
efficient boats depend on the aggregate production of the industry. All that can
be said is that supply for the short period is upward sloping ‘even as regards
industries which in the long period follow the tendency to increasing returns’ (I:
370) because, as Williams suggests, ‘starting from a position of industry equi-
librium producers will only be willing to expand production if offered a higher
price’. (Williams, 1978, 90)
In the short period analysis, Marshall develops the concept of quasi-rent. It
is the ‘surplus of total receipts over prime cost’ (I: 377) when appliances of pro-
duction are fixed; as such it partakes both of the nature of interest and of rent.
Being a surplus of revenue over cost, i.e. the income earned on an investment of
capital, it resembles the category of profits, but since its source is the scarcity,
or fixed availability, of a particular capital good it has the nature of rent. Just
like rent, as stressed by Guillebaud (1952, 125), it is a price-determined and
not a price-determining class of income: ‘Variations in the particular income
derived from [those appliances]...do not directly affect the price of commodities
produced by them.’ (I: 376-7) Marshall carefully analyzed its similarities and
differences with interest and rent. On the one hand he notices: ‘That which is
rightly regarded as interest on ‘free’ or ‘floating’ capital, or on new investment
of capital, is more properly treated as a sort of rent -Quasi-rent- on old invest-
ment of capital’ (I: 412); on the other hand the relation between rent and quasi
rent depends on the different nature of land and appliances: while ‘land...is..a
permanent and fixed stock ’ appliances ‘are a practically fixed stock for short pe-
riods’. (I: 431-2) Quasi-rents are temporary rents, which gradually shade into
interest on floating capital as we move from short to long period analysis. The
new concept allowed Marshall to reconcile the existence of a surplus of revenues
over costs on the non-marginal lines of production with the classical notion of
equilibrium where profits are absent.
5.3.3 Long period
When Marshall turned to the long period analysis of supply for the manu-
facturing sector, he had to solve the third of the problems raised by Cournot
analysis, namely the reconciliation of competitive conditions and increasing re-
turns. Since the early writings Marshall underlined the relevance of external
economies in accounting for a decreasing industry supply price; however, con-
trary to Cournot, he would not deem competition and unexhausted internal
economies as incompatible. Marshall’s solution is based on the concept of rep-
resentative firm and the related idea of life cycle of the individual firm.
The representative firm ‘must be one which is managed with normal ability,
and which has normal access to the economies external and internal, which
belong to that aggregate volume of production. ... [it] is that particular sort
of average firm at which we need to look in order to see how far economies,
internal and external, of production on a large scale have extended generally
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in the industry and country in question’. (I: 264-5) It is the tool by which the
normal cost and normal supply price of a given aggregate volume of production
are illustrated; from this point of view it is simply an explanatory device, ‘a
small-scale replica of the supply-curve of the industry as a whole’ (Robertson,
1930, 89), or ‘a miniature illustration of the supply side’. (Frisch, 1950, 512)
There is no attempt to derive industry supply conditions from the behavior of the
individual producer. As Marshall comments: ‘. . . the history of the individual
firm cannot be made into the history of an industry any more than the history of
an individual man can be made into the history of mankind. And yet the history
of mankind is the outcome of the history of individuals; and the aggregate
production for a general market is the outcome of the motives which induce
individual producers to expand or contract their output.’ (I: 380). However,
the representative firm is much more than a mere illustration of general supply
conditions. Its fundamental role can be appreciated by observing when Marshall
introduces it. It appears in (IV, xiii) where he summarizes the results obtained
for the law of increasing and decreasing returns. He considers the possibility
that internal economies may lead to the extinction of competition: ‘The increase
in the scale of [an able man’s] business increases rapidly the advantages which
he has over his competitors, and lower the price at which he can afford to sell.
[..] and if [this process] could endure for a hundred years, he and one or two like
him would divide between them the whole of that branch of industry in which
he is engaged’ (I: 315). In order to deal with the problem Marshall turns to
the famous metaphor of the trees in a forest (‘But here we may read a lesson
from the young trees of the forestas’, I: 315). Just like the trees of a forest,
firms have a regular life cycle, which implies beginning small and weak, slowly
increasing their market shares and access to internal and external economies,
peaking and gradually declining. In equilibrium, while each individual firm is
going through its life cycle, the age distribution of the firms population is stable
so that the representative firm keeps its size and cost structure constant. The
effectiveness of the life cycle in preventing a firm from accessing all the available
internal economies, thus monopolizing the market, depends on the relatively
long time required to build up internal economies as compared to the duration
of the managerial skills of the entrepreneur. In turn, the plausibility of the
life cycle seems to depend on two conditions: on the one hand, increasing sales
must take time so that the acquisition of internal economies is limited by the
difficulty of marketing additional production; this requires that products be
not homogenous. On the other hand, a high level of managerial skills cannot
be maintained after the firm’s founder retired. According to Marshall, the
availability of vast economies of scale occurs in those industries where firms are
confined to their own market and where a high increase in production could
not be easily sold: ‘There are many trades in which an individual producer
could secure much increased «internal» economies by a great increase of his
output; and there are many in which he could market that output easily, yet
there are few in which he could do both. And this is not an accidental, but
almost a necessary result’ (I: 286). Commodities obeying the law of increasing
returns are mostly ‘specialties’ aimed ‘at creating a new want’ which ‘must win
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their way to general favour slowly’ (I: 287): increasing returns and product
differentiation are explicitly associated. Later on, when studying the normal
equilibrium with reference to increasing returns (V, xiii), the idea of a special
market is described by an individual demand curve: ‘This may be expressed by
saying that when we are considering an individual producer, we must couple his
supply curve - not with the general demand curve for his commodity in a wide
market, but- with the particular demand curve of his own special market. And
this particular demand curve will generally be very steep; perhaps as steep as
his own supply curve is likely to be, even when an increased output will give
him an important increase of internal economies’ (I: 458 n.). Anticipating the
analysis of imperfect and monopolistic competition, Marshall introduced the
notion of a downward-sloping individual demand curve to deal with increasing
returns. However, contrary to subsequent developments (see Triffin 1940), it did
not imply the abandonment of the notion of industry which is to be understood
in a broad way as encompassing producers selling in their own particular market
but still operating under competitive conditions.19 As of the second condition,
Marshall became progressively aware that the natural decay of a firm could be
compromised by the existence of joint stock companies. In the first edition of the
Principles (1890), where the life cycle is put forward for the first time (‘And as
with the growth of trees, so it is with the growth of business’, II: 343), he already
felt the need to qualify the theory by noticing: ‘There is no rule of universal
application; but the struggle between the solid strength of steady-going firms
with the large capitals on the one hand, and the quick inventiveness and energy,
the suppleness and power of variation of their smaller rivals on the other, seems
inclined to issue in the large majority of cases in the victory of the former.’ (II:
345). With time his skepticism grew to the point that from the sixth edition
on (1910) the analogy between firms and trees is said to be valid only before
the development of joint-stock companies: ‘And as with the growth of trees, so
was it with the growth of businesses as a general rule before the great recent
development of vast joint-stock companies, which often stagnate, but never die.’
(I: 263). However, despite this admission, he defended the life cycle theory until
the final edition of the Principles: ‘If [the guidance of the business] is turned
into a joint-stock company, it may retain the advantages of division of labour
[. . . ]. But it is likely to have lost so much of its elasticity and progressive force,
that the advantages are no longer exclusively on its side in its competition
with younger and smaller rival’ (I: 263-4). It is only with the appearance of
Industry and Trade (1919), the long awaited volume on ‘Superstructure’, that
the life cycle is finally abandoned: ‘A private firm without great vigour is sure
to die: a large joint stock company has special advantages, many of which do
not materially dwindle with age. ... And, even if it be somewhat lacking in
energy and initiative, it can often utilize...new ideas and new appliances that
have been created by independent workers: and it has special opportunities for
the introduction of new blood into its management’ (Marshall, 1919, 316).20
19 See Hague (1958) on the difficulties connected to the coexistence of particular markets
and competition.
20 See Whitaker (2003) on the evolution of the role of joint stock company in Marshall.
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The last edition of the Principles is one year older than Industry and Trade;
the fact that Marshall retained the life cycle even at a point when he thought
it did not apply anymore confirms how fundamental the concept was to the
validity of his theory of normal supply.
Since the second edition (1891) of the Principles, Marshall introduced the
notion of particular expenses (PE) curve to represent cost and supply conditions
when the ‘general economies of production [are taken] as fixed and uniform’ at
the level corresponding to the equilibrium output (I: 811). Following Whitaker
(1990, 39) we can interpret it as a curve arraying ‘the total output of the vari-
ous firms by current average cost’; since economies of scale are fixed and costs
incurred by firms of different ages are ordered by decreasing efficiency the PE
curve is upward sloping even for the case of an increasing returns industry. The
stage of the life cycle reached by a firm determines the cost of production and
the market share of each firm; in turn, production is not pushed to the point
where marginal cost equals price. Marshall indeed is adamant that by long pe-
riod marginal supply price he does not mean the rate of increase of total cost,
i.e. marginal cost, but ‘Total Cost of production at the margin’ (letter to Edge-
worth 1892, in II: 810), which is to be understood as the unit cost of equilibrium
output, or the average cost of the representative firm.21 The development of the
PE curve to complement the supply curve helps understanding why for the case
of increasing returns ‘the term «margin of production» has no significance’ and
why, on the contrary, ‘the cost of a whole process of production, without any
attempt to isolate that of a single commodity’ (I: 805) should be considered. In
turn, it helps avoiding what had been Cournot’s fundamental mistake: ‘..Some
among whom Cournot himself is to be counted, have before them what is in
effect the supply schedule of an individual firm; representing that an increase in
its output gives it command over so great internal economies as much to dimin-
ish its expenses of production; and they follow their mathematics boldly, but
apparently without noticing that their premises lead inevitably to the conclu-
sion that, whatever firm gets a good start will obtain a monopoly of the whole
business of its trade in its district.’(I: 459, n.) Regardless of how successful the
concepts of representative firm and life cycle as solutions to the problem of in-
creasing returns are considered,22 it is clear that they led Marshall’s analysis of
long run equilibrium for the case of increasing returns industries far away from
21 In Manuale di Economia Pura (1889) Pantaleoni reproduced the diagrams of supply curve
put forward by Marshall in the The Pure Theory. As we saw, these diagrams represent supply
as expenses per unit of output, or average cost, curves. In the English version, Pure Economics
(1898, 192, n.) Pantaleoni suggested that Marshall should substitute a marginal expenses
curve to the expenses per unit curve in order to represent supply. Since Pure Economics
follows the third edition of Marshall’s Principles he clearly implied that marginal cost curve
was extraneous to the Principles. We know that Pantaleoni visited Marshall in Cambridge (see
Groenewegen, 1995, 244) but unfortunately no correspondence between them has survived.
(see Whitaker, 1996, 283, n.) Marshall however, did not follow Pantaleoni’s advice in the
following editions of the Principles. In turn, we are inclined to think he did not consider
marginal cost as a solid basis for long period supply curve.
22 See the 1930 symposium hosted by the Economic Journal with Sraffa and Robertson as
respectively the main critic and defender.
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Cournot’s notion of marginal cost pricing.
The compatibility between competition and increasing returns is only one as-
pect of a more general reconciliation problem that Marshall attempted to handle
with the aid of the representative firm. Marshall’s interpreters (see among the
others Hart 1991, 1996, 2003; Groenewegen 2003 and Quéré 2003) have recog-
nized a fundamental difference in scope and methodology between book IV and
V of the Principles. Book four studies ‘the mechanisms that conduct the dy-
namics of industrial organization’ (Quéré, 2003, 183); such dynamics is highly
irreversible and increasing returns are its fundamental driving force. Book five,
on the contrary, is concerned with static equilibrium of normal demand and
supply. Mechanical analogies, like ‘a stone hanging by an elastic string’ (323)
or a pendulum, are appropriate for the static equilibrium framework, but the
study of increasing returns belongs to those ‘higher stages of our work’ (323)
which cannot be explained with the help of mechanical equilibrium but need be
analyzed by means of biological analogies. The influence of social evolutionary
thinkers such as Spencer and Hearn on Marshall’s thought is well known (see
Groenewegen 1995); in fact, he seems to have been increasingly turning to bi-
ology throughout the years. Since the fifth edition of the Principles (1907), he
introduced in the Preface the famous quote:23 ‘The Mecca of the economists lies
in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics ’ (I: xiv). The metaphor
of the trees of the forest is the biological analogy that allows Marshall to reduce
a situation of individual (firms) disequilibrium to aggregate (industrial) equilib-
rium. By so doing, he attempts ‘to construct an equilibrium concept that could
be used to shed light on outcomes of processes that are recognized to be con-
tinuous and irreversible in time’ (Hart, 2003, 1140) and to represent ‘within an
equilibrium framework, outcomes of ‘evolutionary’ processes identified directly
with the increasing returns and thus the long period industry supply schedule.’
(ibid., 1144) Since our focus is merely on the notion of equilibrium price, we
need not assess here whether such attempt was a success (‘a peculiar triumph
in his creation of a unity out of the conceptions of equilibrium and evolution’,
Shackle, 1965, 36) or a failure (‘economic biology remained promise rather than
substance’, Thomas, 1991, 11). However, the discussion shows that for the case
of increasing returns Marshall moved away from the notion of static marginal-
istic equilibrium.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the analysis of supply took a different direction.
Cantabrigian economists, possibly more interested in developing Marshall’s the-
ory rather than interpreting it, perfected the notion of perfectly competitive par-
tial equilibrium. In his attack, Sraffa (1925, 1926) interpreted Marshall along
marginalistic lines. He claimed that economies external to the firm but internal
to the industry are the only kind of increasing returns compatible with equilib-
rium and that, unfortunately, they would be the class of economies most difficult
to find in industrial reality. In his reply, Pigou (1927, 1928) implicitly accepted
23 The quote was already present in Marshall (1898).
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Sraffa’s interpretation. In the first place, he objected to Sraffa’s dismissal of
external economies by defending their relevance and developing the concept of
external-internal economies,24 i.e. economies internal to the firm that can be
only activated by an increase in the size of the market. Second, he turned the
‘representative firm’ into the ‘equilibrium firm’, a firm with ‘a certain optimum
size, trespass beyond which yields no further internal economies’ (1927, 195). In
so doing, even without requiring the equilibrium of each individual firm, Pigou
laid the foundation for bringing the Marshallian analysis back to Cournot.25 In
the process, two problems were being solved: assuming a U -shaped cost curve
with the equilibrium firm producing at its minimum eliminated the equilib-
rium profits; the existence of external economies allowed for the possibility of a
decreasing industry supply price. The microfoundation of supply curve under
perfect competition was further refined by Kaldor (1934) who suggested a fixed
entrepreneurial factor as a rationale for the long run U-shape cost curve; and by
Robinson (1934) who unambiguously defined perfect competition in terms of an
infinitely elastic demand curve. The clearest exposition and systematization of
all the possible relations between firm and industrial cost and supply curves has
been however elaborated outside Cambridge and it is due to Viner (1931). D.
Robertson (1930), who strenuously defended the ‘representative firm’ as Mar-
shall’s authentic solution to the problem of increasing returns, remained at the
time an isolated voice.
6 Average cost and marginal cost pricing: mod-
ern developments
The different nature of pricing rules contained in the Marshallian analysis of
competitive markets work can be better appreciated by considering the direc-
tions towards which they were respectively developed. Sraffa developed the
average cost pricing rule over the course of three decades, which culminated
with the publication of Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities
in 1960. As is well known, Sraffa (1925, 1926) criticized Marshall’s long period
partial equilibrium analysis of the industry by questioning the logical soundness
of the industry non-constant supply curve founded on the production decisions
of a price-taking competitive firm. However, he retained the notion of long-run
prices as the situation where prices cover the average cost, which is inclusive
of the normal rate of profit (see Foley, 2003); as we have seen, this is the equi-
librium notion Marshall had borrowed from the classical economists. Sraffa
generalized this approach by taking into account the general interdependence
of industry structures. Taking the real wage and the scale of production as
given, he was able to derive the existence and uniqueness of a vector of rela-
tive prices satisfying the requirement of a uniform rate of profit on the value
24 This notion is indeed not extraneous to the Principles : ‘But we also expect a gradual
increase in demand to increase ... the economies both internal and external’. (I: 460)
25 Newman (1960, 597) notices: ‘And it was very easy for subsequent workers -and textbooks
writers- to substitute ... “each individual firm” for “equilibrium firm” ’.
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of the capital employed in production. Net output is a given in the analysis so
that there is no attempt to jointly determine equilibrium prices and quantities.
Marshall, on the contrary, had tried to derive simultaneously equilibrium prices
and quantities through the supply and demand approach. As we have seen, in
equilibrium, prices should include the uniform rate of profit (interest), which is
the price equating demand and supply of capital. This attempt, though, would
eventually fail. In fact, during the capital controversy, it was proved that once
heterogeneous capital goods are taken into account, the relation between the
profit rate determined as the marginal product of capital and the quantity of
capital itself violates the fundamental properties required by the marginalistic
theory of production and distribution (see for example Garegnani, 1970). The
average cost pricing principle based on a uniform rate of profit proved incom-
patible with the marginalistic approach.
On the other hand, short-run profit maximization, which implies marginal
cost pricing, became the basis of the neo-Walrasian intertemporal general equi-
librium models (see Arrow and Hahn, 1971). In this framework, when pro-
duction sets are strictly convex firms earn positive profits as marginal cost is
higher than average cost at any level of production. Under constant returns
to scale, profits are null. However, the mechanisms enforcing the absence of
profits in the neo-Walrasian constant returns case and in the classical case are
quite different. In the classical case, given the free mobility of capital, there is a
long period tendency of prices towards their average costs of production; in the
neo-Walrasian case, the absence of profits emerges instantaneously as the only
possibility compatible with finite production plans.
On reflection, it appears that the attempt to elaborate general equilibrium
pricing principles in terms of average cost and marginal cost led to the former
to return to the classical theory of value and distribution and the abandonment
of the absence of profits in the latter. Besides having different origins these two
concepts characterizing Marshall’s theory of market equilibrium had to part
their ways to be fully developed.
7 Concluding Remarks
I have tried to show how two different characterizations of equilibrium prices
merged in the Marshallian theory of the firm. The equality between price and
average cost is the result of competition between firms searching for the highest
returns on capital. Marginal cost pricing requires the introduction of the notion
of optimal scale of production, that is a scale where costs and revenues on the
marginal unit produced are equal. Average cost and marginal cost pricing have
quite different origins and two different concepts of competition underlie them.
Average cost pricing requires classical competition, that is free entry and exit
in the market; marginal cost pricing needs perfect competition: the negligible
dimension of the firm prevents it from affecting prices when changing its quan-
tity so that the profit maximizing production requires the equality of marginal
cost and price. We saw that Marshall’s economic education led him to assume
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the tendency of prices to costs of production as the natural outcome of com-
petition and the obvious starting point for his theory of value. We found only
partial support for Marshall’s adoption of marginal cost pricing; in particular,
we argued that he found it appropriate to describe the agricultural sector and
production of raw materials in general. However, he built analytical tools such
as the distinction between short and long period, and the notion of quasi rents
and external economies, which made it possible for his followers to develop his
theory along marginalistic lines, and to provide us with the long run partial
equilibrium where price equalizes both average and marginal cost of each in-
dividual firm. The attempt of generalizing the analysis to general equilibrium
framework shows that the two pricing rule are still difficult to reconcile.
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